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h i g h l i g h t s
• We study a natural setting in privatizations with an incumbent and many entrants.
• The first price auction may allocate more efficiently than the open ascending auction.
• The revenue ranking we find differs from the one in the existing literature.
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a b s t r a c t
We provide a natural setting in privatizations in which the equilibrium of the first price auction gives
greater expected surplus than any equilibrium of the open ascending auction.
1. Introduction
The auction theorist’s toolkit proposes an open ascending auc-
tion, see for instance Maskin (1992), or any of its variations, like 
proxy auctions or clock auctions, when the objective is efficiency 
and more sophisticated mechanisms like a Vickrey–Clarke–Groves 
auction are impracticable. Indeed, Krishna (2003) shows for the 
case of an indivisible unit that under additive separability of the 
value function (which can be interpreted as a first order approach) 
and a minor monotonicity condition, the open ascending auction
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implements the ex post efficient allocation whenever the ex post 
efficient allocation is implementable. In the same case, the alter-
native of using a first price auction is considered to be less efficient 
for its inability to deal with asymmetries across bidders, see for 
instance Maskin and Riley (2000).
In contrast to those conclusions, our main result shows that the
first price auction may induce greater ex ante expected surplus
than the open ascending auction when the ex post efficient allo-
cation is not implementable.2 Interestingly, this finding is derived
for a realistic model of privatizations in which asymmetries across
bidders arise because an incumbent has better information and
lower setup costs than the other bidders, the entrants.
We are not aware of such a result in the literature. The only 
related observation is that the first price auction may Pareto 
dominate the open ascending auction when both the buyer and 
the seller are risk averse, see Holt (1980), Riley and Samuelson
2 Actually, the first price auction maximizes the ex ante expected surplus sub-
ject to implementability in our setting, as one can show adapting the results 
of Hernando-Veciana and Michelucci (in press).
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(1981), Matthews (1983) and Maskin and Riley (1984). The con-
nection, however, is weak since we assume risk neutrality.
2. The model
Our model captures a common situation in privatizations: an
incumbent has private information about a common component of
the value, and entrants have higher setup costs but possibly lower
variable costs than the incumbent.3
More specifically, we assume that a set of firms indexed by
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n + 1}, n > 1,4 compete for a privatized service
that gives profits π (D, Ci) > 0 after the firm incurs in a setup
cost ki, and where D denotes a demand shifter and Ci an individual
variable cost shifter, e.g. Firm i’s marginal cost. π (D, Ci) is contin-
uous, increasing in D, decreasing in Ci, and strictly submodular in
(D, Ci): ∂
2π (d,c)
∂d∂c < 0. The interpretation of submodularity is that the
higher the demand, themore beneficial is for the firm tohave lower
variable costs. This assumption is satisfied bymost of the economic
models that give rise to the function π .5
Firm 1 is an incumbent already operating the service. It pri-
vately knows the demand for the service D, which is assumed to
be an independent random variable that follows a distribution F
with density and support [d, d]. In general, we use capital letters
to denote the random variable and lower case letters to denote a
realization of the random variable.
Each of the other firms, the entrants, have the same setup cost
ki = k greater than the incumbent’s, i.e. k > k1. To simplify the
notation we let k1 = 0.6 Setup costs are commonly known but
variable costs are the firm’s private information. Each Ci is assumed
to be a randomvariable that follows an independent distributionGi
with positive density over the support [c i, c i]. To simplify notation,
we assume all the entrant’s Gi’s have the same support [c, c].
Our results are derived under three main assumptions:7
A1. E[π (D, c)] − k > π (d, c1).
A2. π (d, c)− k < π (d, c1).
A3. All the entrants variable costs follow the same distribution,
Gi = G for all i ̸= 1.
A1 says that the average value of an entrant with maximum
variable cost is greater than the maximum incumbent’s value.
Since π is decreasing in its second argument, A1 is satisfied if k
is not too large and c1 is sufficiently larger than c , i.e. if the incum-
bent’s setup cost advantage is small and entrants have sufficiently
lower variable costs than the incumbent. A2 says that in the case
of the minimum demand, the entrants have lower value than the
incumbent with probability one. Since π is strictly submodular, A2
only requires a sufficiently small d if we also assume that c < c1.
A3 is a requirement that entrants are ex ante symmetric.
A1 is the most demanding of our assumptions. It guarantees
that there exists an equilibrium of the first price auction in which
the range of the entrants’ bid function and the incumbent’s do not
overlap. This equilibrium has a straightforward characterization.
3 Our model is inspired by an example proposed by Maskin (1992), pages 127–8, 
to illustrate that the ex post efficient allocation may not be implementable. This is 
also the case here. The explanation is the same as in Maskin’s example.
4 The case of only two bidders is special as in this case the open ascending auction 
maximizes the expected surplus subject to implementability under fairly general 
conditions, see Hernando-Veciana and Michelucci (2011).
5 For instance, suppose the sale of a license to operate an unregulated monopoly
with linear demand Q (p) = D − p and constant marginal cost Ci . In this case,
π (D, Ci) = (D−Ci)22 , which satisfies our assumptions.
6 This is without loss of generality as the setup cost of the incumbent can
always be incorporated in the function π . In this case, the interpretation of k is the
difference between the entrant’s setup cost and the incumbent’s.
7 E[. . .] denotes the expected value of the expression between the brackets.
We expect our ranking to be robust to a weakening of A1 that 
allows the incumbent to win with positive probability in equilib-
rium. However, the derivation of the equilibrium becomes sub-
stantially more complex and requires of an adaptation of the 
complex analysis of asymmetric first price auctions, see, for in-
stance, Lebrun (2006).
A2 is also stronger than it is needed. Lemma 2(b) only requires 
that a sufficiently small level for the demand exists such that a set 
of types of the entrants with positive probability have a lower value 
than the incumbent. By assuming this happens with probability 
one, we can shorten substantially the proof of Lemma 2. A3 guar-
antees the existence of an equilibrium of the first price auction in 
which entrants use the same strictly monotone bid function and, 
consequently, that the entrant with lowest cost outbids the other 
entrants. More generally, our efficiency ranking should hold true 
provided that asymmetries are not too large.
3. The analysis
We start our comparison with the study of the first price auc-
tion,8 see Krishna (2010) for a description of the rules. Our first 
result shows that this auction format has an equilibrium in strictly 
monotone strategies in which all the entrants use the same bid 
function. The key feature is that this equilibrium displays that the 
incumbent is outbid with probability one.9
Lemma 1. There exists an equilibrium of the first price auction in
which the entrant with the highest value wins with probability one.
Proof. We propose some strategies that satisfy the conditions of 
the proposition, and argue that they constitute an equilibrium. 
We propose that the incumbent bids his value π (D, C1) and the 
entrants play the unique symmetric equilibrium strategy of a first 
price auction, see for instance Krishna (2010), with n bidders with 
value function V (c) ≡ E[π(D, c)] − k. Since the entrants’ strategy is 
strictly decreasing and the entrant with largest cost bids V (c) ≡ 
E[π(D, c)] − k, A1 means that the entrant with lowest cost wins 
with probability one as required. A1 also means that there is no 
price at which the incumbent can win with positive profits. Hence, 
the incumbent has no incentive to deviate. Entrants do not have 
incentives to deviate within the range of their bid function by 
construction, whereas deviations outside the range of their bid 
function are not strictly profitable: lower bids always lose and 
higher bids do not win with higher probability than with the 
maximum bid in the range but mean paying a higher price. 
In what follows, we assume that this is the equilibrium played
in the first price auction.
Next, we turn to the open ascending auction, see Krishna 
(2010) for a description of the general rules. We assume the usual 
uniformly-random tie-breaking rule, see Hernando-Veciana and 
Michelucci (in press) for the details.10 Note that the incumbent 
knows his value and thus its unique weakly dominant strategy is 
to remain in the auction until his value is reached. In what follows, 
we restrict to equilibria with this feature, that is we restrict to 
equilibria in weakly undominated strategies.
8 The proof of Lemma 1 can easily be adapted to show that the second price 
auction is also more efficient than the open ascending auction in our setting. 
However, we find the comparison with the first price auction more striking.
9 Although, we do not claim uniqueness, we expect that A1 is sufficient to rule
out that the incumbent wins in equilibrium. More generally, we expect that the
equilibrium outcome is unique although its proof may be cumbersome.
10 Hernando-Veciana and Michelucci (in press) also discusses other tie-breaking 
rules.
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Lemma 2. There is no equilibrium of the open ascending auction
in which either: (a) the incumbent wins with positive probability, or
(b) the entrant with highest value wins with probability one.
Proof. To prove (a), note that the incumbent canwinwith positive
probability if and only if the last entrant remaining active quits
with positive probability before the incumbent does.We argue that
this cannot happen in equilibrium: if the incumbent and only one
entrant are active, the entrant has a strict incentive to remain active
until the incumbent quits. This is because the entrant’s expected
utility when she stays active until the incumbent quits is equal to:
E [π (D, c)− k− π (D, C1)|π (D, C1) ≥ p]
≥ E [π (D, c)− k− π (d, c1)⏐⏐π (D, C1) ≥ p]
≥ E [π (D, c)− k− π (d, c1)]
> 0,
where c denotes the entrant’s cost and p the current price, and
recall that π (D, C1) is the incumbent’s value and hence his bid.
The first inequality is a direct consequence of the monotonicity
of π , and the last one follows from Assumption A1. To prove the
second inequality, we show that the distribution of D conditional
on the event {π (D, C1) ≥ p} first order stochastically dominates its
unconditional distribution. Consider the difference between both
distributions evaluated at a point d ∈ [d, d]:
Γ (d) ≡
∫ d
d
f (x)G1(ψ(x))∫ d
d f (x˜)G1(ψ(x˜))dx˜
dx−
∫ d
d
f (x)dx
=
∫ d
d
f (x)
⎛⎝ G1(ψ(x))∫ d
d f (x˜)G1(ψ(x˜))dx˜
− 1
⎞⎠ dx, (1)
whereψ(x) is equal to the value of c1 that solvesπ (x, c1) = p if any,
and otherwise either c1 or c1 depending on whether π (x, c1) < p
or π (x, c1) > p for all c1. To complete the proof, just note that
Γ (d) ≤ 0 because Γ (d) = Γ (d) = 0 and Γ is quasi-convex since
its derivative crosses zero only once and from below because ψ is
an increasing function.
To prove that there is no equilibrium that satisfies (b), we argue
by contradiction. First, we show that any equilibrium that satisfies
(b) also satisfies another property to which we refer to as (P). Next,
we argue that (b) and (P) imply that there is a profitable deviation.
The property (P) is that only one entrant remains active along the
equilibrium path as the price goes above the minimum value of
the incumbent π (d, c). To prove that (b) implies (P) recall that
the incumbent quits at price π (D, C1). Thus, the expected profit of
winning for an entrant with cost c at a price p ≥ π (D, C1) after the
incumbent has quits at price p˜ is equal to:
E[π (D, c)− k− p|π (D, C1) = p˜]
≤ E[π (D, c)− k− p˜|π (D, C1) = p˜],
which is strictly negative when p˜ is close to π (d, c1) by A2. This
means that any entrant still active quits immediately after the
incumbent when the incumbent quits at a price close to π (d, c1).
Consequently, the tie-breaking rule means that only one entrant
can remain active if (b) is to be satisfied.
Finally, we provide a contradiction by arguing that there is a
profitable deviation for an entrant with type c from any equi-
librium that satisfies (b) and (P). This entrant must lose with
probability one when (b) is satisfied. However, she has a profitable
deviation consisting on remaining in the auction until all the other
bidders quit. In this case, (P) means that the deviating entrant wins
with probability one and pays the incumbent’s bid π (D, C1). This
gives a expected payoff of:
E[π (D, c)− k− π (D, C1)],
which is strictly positive by Assumption A1. ■
The proof of the lemma exploits the fact, already pointed out 
in Hernando-Veciana and Michelucci (in press), that open ascend-
ing auctions are prompt to inefficient rushes when the ex post 
efficient allocation is not implementable.
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply the following corollary as our main 
result.
Corollary 1. The equilibrium of the first price auction gives greater
expected surplus than any equilibrium of the open ascending auction.
4. Conclusions
This note adds to the current literature a somewhat surprising
ranking between the open ascending auction and first price auction
by providing a realistic environment for which the latter auction
dominates the former in terms of expected surplus.
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